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This paper provides a theoretical overview of monetary and fiscal policy
with the potential to engineer an exit from a deflationary trap, which we
define here as sustained deflation in the presence of zero interest rates. We
find that the required policy steps are an interest rate hike, a commitment
to future currency growth, and a money-financed tax cut. The amount of
tax cut required is equal to the increase in the central bank’s payments to
the treasury resulting from the higher inflation rate (nominal interest
rate), while fiscal policymakers must maintain fiscal discipline by stabiliz-
ing government debt and the primary balance. There will be a temporary
fall in output when prices are sticky, but this is the price that must 
be paid to conquer deflation. The current commitment to quantitative 
easing is based on the assumption that the natural interest rate has 
temporarily declined. If the economy is in a deflationary trap, however,
the continuation of zero interest rates reinforces deflationary expectations
and may make it perpetually impossible to eliminate deflation. Even
under conditions in which the natural rate of interest seems to be positive,
if deflation persists, it is probably wise to consider a policy approach that
assumes deflationary trap conditions. With this in mind, we believe the
conditions required for abandoning the current policy regime should
include, in addition to consistently positive growth in the consumer price
index (CPI), a consideration of the trend in real GDP.
Keywords:  Monetary policy; Zero bound on interest rates; Liquidity
trap; Deflationary trap; Non-Ricardian fiscal policy regime
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In February 1999, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) implemented a zero interest rate 
policy (ZIRP), aimed at supplying the market with ample liquidity while keeping 
the uncollateralized overnight call rate as low as possible. In August 2000, the BOJ
announced the end of the ZIRP, but then followed up in March 2001 with its 
quantitative easing policy, thereby effectively restoring zero interest rates, and this
policy remains in effect today. Monetary policy confined to the traditional tools of
manipulating interest rates can maximize monetary easing, but Japan’s economic
recoveries have regularly disappointed, and since 1998 the GDP deflator has con-
sistently recorded price declines in year-on-year terms (Figure 1 shows the level of
short-term interest rates and inflation since 1990).
Keynes (1936) argued that zero interest rates have the negative aspect of producing
a liquidity trap whereby a further increase in the money supply has no expansionary
effects, but Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) point out a positive aspect, noting that
zero interest rates accommodate the optimal supply of money. Previously, the existence
of a zero bound on nominal interest rates was often ignored, but since zero interest rates
became a fixture in Japan beginning in the 1990s, a considerable body of research has
been produced that takes this zero bound into account. 
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Note: The short-term interest rate is the (average) uncollateralized overnight call rate.
The CPI growth rate is the year-on-year change in the CPI (nationwide, excluding
fresh food). For prices following the consumption tax hike in fiscal 1997, we have
deducted 1.5 percent from the actual price to correct for the price increase 
attributable to the tax hike.
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau, “Consumer
Price Index.”1. The natural interest rate, positioned by Woodford (2003) as a core concept for monetary policy management, has
generated substantial interest recently.
2. See Svensson (2003) for a range of policy measure proposals suitable under the zero bound on interest rates.
3. It is important to note here that the policy commitment effect works in forward-looking models where economic
agents project the future, but Oda and Muranaga (2003) base their empirical research on a backward-looking model.
Within the literature dealing with zero interest rates, Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2005), Eggertsson (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, Teranishi, and
Watanabe (2005), Krugman (1998), and Woodford (1999) argue that even when the
natural rate of interest (the level of interest rates that occurs when prices are flexible) is
declining and the nominal interest rate corresponding to the optimal inflation target is
negative, the real interest rate remains high since nominal interest rates cannot actually
become negative.
1At the same time, however, they assume that the natural rate of inter-
est would rise in the future, thereby eliminating zero interest rates. In this case, an
increase in only the current money supply through open market operations is nothing
more than an exchange of government bonds with money, which are perfect substitutes
when interest rates are zero, and thus has no impact on the real economy. However, by
increasing the money supply at a future date when interest rates are no longer zero,
future prices rise, and the effects of this future rise in prices extend to the present. Using
a two-period model, Krugman (1998) showed that an increase in future prices raises
the current inflation rate, and thus has an expansionary effect on current income via
the resulting decline in real interest rates.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), and
Woodford (1999) note that, when interest rates are the monetary policymakers’ 
control variable, a commitment to maintain monetary easing even after the natural
interest rate recovers to a positive value can make monetary easing effective under
zero interest rates by lowering long-term interest rates. In Japan, the pursuit of 
additional easing effects under zero interest rates by committing to monetary easing
in the future has been referred to as the “policy commitment effect,” or the “policy
duration effect.” Essentially, when the BOJ implemented the ZIRP in April 1999, 
it committed to holding interest rates at zero until deflationary concerns were 
dispelled, while its implementation of quantitative easing came with a commitment
to stick with the policy until the CPI (nationwide, excluding fresh food) stabilizes at
either a zero or positive rate of growth in year-on-year terms. Both Fujiki and
Shiratsuka (2002) and Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) examined the effects of this
policy commitment and found that the expression of commitment led to a reduc-
tion in long-term interest rates, but that monetary policy transmission channels
failed to function and thus the effects did not reach the real economy. Whether
more proactive monetary policy measures are required has been a major point of
contention in recent years.
2
Nevertheless, with interest rates persisting near zero, it is no easy matter to ascer-
tain when in the future interest rates will diverge from zero. This is because of the
variety of economic factors that influence the natural interest rate and the extreme
difficulty of ascertaining, accurately and in a timely manner, what that rate is. Oda
and Muranaga (2003) pointed out the possibility that there were periods since 1997
when the natural rate of interest was negative.
3 On the other hand, it is also possible
3
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and Saito (2004) argue that Japan’s natural interest rate is not negative.
If Japan’s natural rate of interest were currently positive and remained positive
moving forward, it would substantially change the debate over monetary policy. First,
if nominal interest rates were held to zero under a positive natural interest rate, it
would lead to deflation in the long run. Assuming that the real interest rate converges
to the natural interest rate over the long term, this can be confirmed from the 
relationship between interest rates and the inflation rate shown by the Fisher 
equation.
4 Second, it is possible to interpret a future increase in the natural interest
rate as an economic recovery driven by an increased demand for goods. This would
mean that without an increase in the natural interest rate there would be no prospects
for a higher level of economic activity stemming from a self-sustained increase in
demand in the future. This would be, in other words, an approach toward monetary
policy grounded in pessimistic assumptions about the future.
There are essential differences in the framework for analyzing monetary policy
between conditions under which zero interest rates were caused by a large, temporary
drop in the natural interest rate and conditions characterized by a sustained period of
zero interest rates and deflation while natural interest rates are at their normal level.
We will distinguish between the two in this paper by referring to the former as a 
liquidity trap and the latter as a deflationary trap.
One possible reason that the economy falls into a deflationary trap despite the
central bank not pursuing a deflation target is that the central bank errs in setting
interest rates as a result of the difficulty in quickly recognizing when shocks affect the
natural interest rate. Meanwhile, recent research has found that it is possible for the
economy to fall into a deflationary trap even if the central bank pursues monetary
policies that are consistent with an inflation target. Although Kerr and King (1996)
and Leeper (1991) showed that a rational expectations equilibrium could be achieved
if monetary policy adheres to the Taylor rule, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe
(2001) noted that this argument ignores the zero bound on nominal interest rates,
and showed that, when taking account of the zero bound, a deflationary trap was
globally stable and that there were an infinite number of paths toward that state.
Additionally, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) showed that when economic agents 
base their decisions on adaptive learning rather than rational expectations, although
learning makes it impossible for the deflationary trap itself to occur, there is a 
possibility that a path leading to an inflation rate that is even lower than under a
deflationary trap will be chosen.
5 On the other hand, Bullard and Cho (2002) found
that under adaptive learning the presence of escape dynamics leads to a major decline
in both nominal interest rates and inflation, and imply that this could provide an
explanation of conditions in Japan.
An explanation based on monetary quantity would be expected to posit that 
monetary growth would cause inflation, but if zero interest rates become permanent
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4. In the standard use of the Fisher equation, the Fisher effect is posited as a one-for-one increase in nominal interest
rates in response to an increase in the inflation rate. Here, we use the Fisher equation to explain the inverse of that
relationship.
5. For a comprehensive explanation of adaptive learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).it would rule out that future point in time posited by Krugman (1998) when the
relationship between the money supply and prices is formed.
6 In Japan today, the
monetary base has been growing but prices have been declining, a situation that is
impossible to explain based on the quantity theory of money alone. The question of
what policies should be pursued to spark inflation under these conditions has been
taken up recently in such papers as Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a)
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Taking cues from progress in this area of research and considering Japan’s current
situation, this paper addresses the question of what policies should be pursued to 
get the Japanese economy out of its deflationary trap, assuming that it has fallen
into such a trap.
The paper takes a two-track approach, searching for conclusions from both the
long-run and short-run perspectives. In Section II, we take the long-run view, 
assuming flexible prices and using a standard monetary growth model to examine the
role of monetary policy. To reflect the zero interest rate environment, we use a
money-in-utility model, whereby the utility provided by money is the motivation for
holding it.
7 When real money balances become sufficiently large and the utility from
holding money is satiated, zero interest rates result. We then show that deflation is
the long-run consequence of zero interest rates and that, under conditions in which
nominal government debt is shrinking, the quantity theory of money does not apply
and that deflation remains in place even as the quantity of money increases. The 
fiscal policy stance plays a critical role here and must be non-Ricardian for inflation
to increase in step with monetary growth. We examine exactly what form such a 
non-Ricardian fiscal policy winds up taking.
If prices are sticky, the possibility that deflation is caused by economic recession
must also be considered. In Section III, we look at the problem from the short-run
perspective. Given that short-run economic fluctuations are the subject of endless
disputes in the field of macroeconomics, we have decided against using a specific
model and opted instead to examine our questions using a variety of models simulta-
neously. We use 20 dynamic models to examine potential monetary policies for
escaping from zero interest rates.
When prices are flexible, an increase in the inflation rate correlates with an
increase in interest rates. Under a monetary policy using interest rates as the control
variable, interest rates would be increased to eliminate deflation. If prices are slow to
adjust, however, when interest rates are the only control variable the increase in the
inflation rate can lag the hike in interest rates. In this case, a decline in output caused
5
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6. The “foolproof way” described by Svensson (2001), in which a weakening of the yen in foreign exchange markets
is used to spark inflation, also relies on other countries to form the relationship between money and prices. 
As recognized by Svensson (2003), this approach would not work if interest rates were at zero outside of Japan. 
Of course, as long as not all countries have zero interest rates, it is theoretically possible to use the exchange rate
approach, but given that it is conceivable that other countries would respond with their own monetary easing, 
if interest rates are initially too low, there is a possibility that both countries would move to zero interest rates and
that the foolproof way would fail to work.
7. Although models where the motivation to hold money is given by the cash-in-advance constraint are common in
the literature, for the points we are making here it is possible to make roughly the same arguments as in a money-
in-utility model. When citing other papers, we will not make any extra effort to highlight the differences between
the cash-in-advance and money-in-utility frameworks.by the increase in real interest rates can occur. We look at the conditions under which
this can occur, and examine its policy implications.
In Section IV, we conclude with a summary of our arguments concerning the best
policy scenario to escape deflation.
II. Zero Interest Rates over the Long Run
A. Budget Constraint for Consolidated Government
When examining the subject of zero interest rates, it is important to look at the inter-
play, via the budget constraint, between the fiscal authorities (government narrowly
defined) and the central bank. This requires taking a closer look at the budget con-
straint that integrates government narrowly defined (hereinafter just “government”)
with the central bank, which we call here consolidated government. To do this, we
must start by deriving the consolidated government’s budget constraint.
We assume no government spending. The government issues new government
bonds only in the amount by which interest payments on existing government bonds
exceed the total of tax revenues and central bank payments to the treasury. Public
debt is short-term nominal debt, and the balance of nominal debt is given as A. The
nominal interest rate is i, treasury payments from the central bank are X, and tax 
revenues are T (all nominal values). Assuming time is continuous, the government’s
budget equation can be written as follows.
A
.
t = itAt −Xt −Tt. (1)
The central bank supplies the monetary base through open market operations,
which it conducts on a regular basis to ensure that the monetary base M, a liability
on its balance sheet, matches the public debt, which is a central bank asset. We
ignore the government’s equity in the central bank, and assume that the central
bank’s profits are not retained but immediately transferred to the government via
payments to the treasury. Using these assumptions, and representing the government
bonds held by the private sector asB, the following equalities hold:
At =Bt +Mt, (2)
Xt = itMt. (3)
Open market operations cause no change in A and are immediately reflected as changes
inB and M. When the level of market operations is small, however, smooth changes 
in B and M are possible, and we consider a budget constraint for the consolidated 
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in government bonds held by the private sector as
B
.
t = itBt −M
.
t −Tt. (5)
Equation (5) indicates that government bonds held by the private sector can only
increase by the amount by which interest payments on those government bonds
exceed seigniorage and tax revenues.




t = (it − t)at −itmt −  t. (6)
Here,   is the inflation rate, m the real money balance, and   tax revenue in real
terms. The interest payments on those bonds issued by the government that are held
by the central bank become treasury payments from the central bank and thus are
returned to the government. This is shown by the second term on the right-hand side
in equation (6). Expressing equation (2) in real values, we get 
at = bt +mt, (7)
which we can use to rewrite the equation expressing the government bonds held by
the private sector as
b
.
t = (it − t)bt −(m .
t +  tmt) −  t. (8)
Equation (8) says that the fiscal deficit comprises interest payments on govern-
ment bonds, seigniorage, and tax revenues. In this equation, b is the real value of 
privately held government bonds. The relationship between the real interest rater and
the nominal interest rate i is given by the Fisher equation
it =rt +  t. (9)
B. Basic Model under Flexible Prices
In this subsection, we assume that prices are flexible and output is always at its 
natural level. To look at the long-run consequences of the ZIRP, we build an 
equation that enables analysis of zero interest rate conditions using the standard
monetary growth model from Brock (1974, 1975) and Sidrauski (1967).
8 Our paper
uses the model from Blanchard and Fischer (1989, chapter 5), with additions to
account for government and zero interest rates. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) provide
a detailed exposition of the basic arguments concerning the model’s behavior and of
related research.
7
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In the above function, c is consumption and r – is the discount rate. The consumer’s
budget constraint is given as 
ct + t + a
.
t =(it − t)at −itmt + yt, (11)
where y is income. An additional constraint is the no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition
limate
–rt ≥ 0. (12)
t→ 
The NPG condition could also be expressed as two inequalities, one each for government
bonds and money.
limbte
–rt ≥ 0, (13.a)
t→ 
limmte
–rt ≥ 0. (13.b)
t→ 
The monetary NPG condition, (13.b), is indisputable because a negative value for m
is impossible. On the other hand, imposing a constraint on consumer borrowing
from the government turns out to be critical, as we will see below. It is possible to 
satisfy (12) while not satisfying (13.a), which would happen when the consumer 
borrows from the government and increases the money balance. In this paper, we
take the NPG condition as the consumer’s budget constraint in continuous time, and
thus view it as a constraint that applies only to the consumer’s accumulated assets.
Therefore, we will use (12). Later in the paper, we explain how using (13.a) and
(13.b) instead changes the argument.
We further assume that the following equation always holds.
y – = y t = ct. (14)
To solve the representative consumer’s optimization problem, the following conditions
must be satisfied:
uc(y –, mt) =  t, (15.a)
um(y –, mt) = tit, (15.b)
 
.
t =  t(r – +  t − it). (15.c)
Based on NPG (12), we also get the following transversality condition:
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–r –t = 0. (16)
t→ 
If using (13.a) and (13.b) for the NPG condition, our transversality conditions are 
as follows.
lim tbte
–r –t = 0, (17.a)
t→ 
lim tmte
–r –t = 0. (17.b)
t→ 
To simplify matters, we assume that both consumption and real money balances are
separable in the instantaneous utility. If so, income would be constant, and therefore
the marginal utility of consumption would become constant and the   of equation
(15.a) would become constant over time. Setting   = 1 with no loss of generality, 
equations (15.b) and (15.c) are transformed into the following equations:
um(mt) =it, (18)
it =r – +  t. (19)
Equation (19) is the Fischer equation, where r – represents both the consumer’s discount
rate and the natural interest rate. Using   for the growth rate of nominal money, 
we get
m .
t –– – =  t −  t. (20) mt
Substituting this into equations (18) and (19), we get
m .
t = (r – + t)mt −um(mt)mt. (21)
To make it possible to look at the zero interest rate condition, we assume that when
real money balances are sufficiently large, utility from holding money is satiated and
marginal utility goes to zero. Stated in symbols,
um(m) = 0,   when m ≥ m – –. (22)
The point at which utility from holding money is satiated is m – –.
C. The ZIRP and the Quantity Theory of Money
The policies proposed by Krugman (1998) to stoke inflation through future mone-
tary growth cannot succeed without a commitment that is credible with the private
sector. On the other hand, our focus in this section is on the possibility that inflation
will not be created under zero interest rates even if there is a credible commitment to
9
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monetary target that holds nominal money growth fixed over the long run.
9
Bear in mind that, in this case, the dynamic structure of the model changes
depending on the relationship between   and r –.
If   >− r –, then economic fluctuations can be represented by the phase diagram
shown in Figure 2. In this paper, based on a widely used assumption, we assume the
inequality below holds to exclude a path whereby real money balances go to zero (a
path whereby the rate of inflation exceeds nominal money growth).
limum(m)m > 0. (23)
m→0
This implies a rapid increase in the marginal utility of money when real money 
balances decline. If this condition is satisfied, m . becomes negative as m approaches
zero, thereby excluding a solution in which m approaches zero.
10 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2005
9. The central bank makes regular monetary adjustments by manipulating interest rates. If the quantity theory of money
holds, targeting a nominal interest rate of (r – + ) can be interpreted as setting a monetary growth target of  .
Figure 2  Dynamic Path with Monetary Targeting (When   > –r –)
0
0









(         )   r +
(m) um
m .In an economy with sticky prices, the initial value ofm is determined by the initial
values of the price level and of the nominal money balance chosen by the central bank,
but in an economy with flexible prices, there is no initial condition for the price level
and the initial value of m is not based on historical conditions. A major point of 
contention is whether to exclude the path whereby m becomes infinitely large (a path
with an inflation rate below the rate of nominal money growth). On a path where m
becomes infinitely large, nominal interest rates will eventually reach zero. Subsequently,
zero interest rates will be expected to remain in perpetuity, and the inflation rate will
remain equal to the natural interest rate times negative one.
 t =− r –. (24)
Since monetary growth is higher than the inflation rate, real money balances
increase. Nevertheless, consumers do not use those funds for consumption, real
money balances increase without limit, and the inflation rate remains below the rate
of monetary growth. Based on this, the solution can be expressed as follows.
um(mt) =0, (25.a)
m .
t/mt =   −   > 0, (25.b)
  =− r –. (25.c)
The quantity theory of money does not hold in this solution, which is characterized
by the persistence of deflation despite an increase in the monetary growth rate. This
could degenerate into a fairly serious type of a liquidity trap. The liquidity trap itself
is normally associated with a demand function for money that has become perfectly
elastic in interest rates. We refer to the condition whereby the quantity theory of
money does not apply as a deflationary trap.
10
Furthermore, since the initial value of m is not given, a solution is obtained 
irrespective of from what point the path toward infinite growth inm departs, as shown
in the upper frame of Figure 2. Accordingly, there is real indeterminacy in the solution,
i.e., there exist an infinite number of solutions with different real values.
11
Excluding the solutions on either side of the deflationary trap and dealing only
with the solution at the point where m . = 0, the economy is such that the price level
adjusts at the starting point and m remains stuck at the level where m . = 0. Under this
equilibrium, these equations hold:
11
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10. This terminology is used by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Sims (2003), Woodford (2003), and others.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a) use the term “liquidity trap.” Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) and
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) call this solution “hyper-deflation.” Nevertheless, since the absolute value of 
the deflation rate is the natural rate of interest, deflation is not necessarily going to be that high, and thus 
hyper-deflation is not the most appropriate term, in our opinion.
11. The first papers to argue this real indeterminacy include Black (1974), Brock (1975), and Sargent and Wallace
(1973). McCallum (2001) calls this solution multiplicity or non-uniqueness.
A different concept is nominal indeterminacy, wherein the real variables within the model are unique, but the
nominal variables (nominal money balance and price level) are not. Nominal indeterminacy is discussed in the
seminal paper by Patinkin (1949), as well as by McCallum (1981) and Sargent and Wallace (1975).um(mt) = r – + , (26.a)
m .
t/mt =   −   = 0. (26.b)
In equilibrium, the monetary growth rate is equal to the inflation rate. Since this
seems to be the most plausible behavior, we will call this the normal equilibrium. 
The mechanism for excluding a deflationary trap and selecting only the normal
equilibrium can be derived from the transversality condition in the consumer’s 
optimization problem. We consider first the transversality condition given by 
equation (16). Since   is a constant, equation (16) can be rewritten as follows.
limate
–r –t = 0. (27)
t→ 
This is another way of saying that assets held by the consumer are not going to grow at
a rate faster than the natural rate of interest r –. This is because, if asset holdings were 
to grow faster than r –, the consumer would be able to improve utility by consuming a
portion of assets.
Since the consumer’s assets are the government’s liabilities, we will focus on how
fiscal authorities manage the government debt.
12 First, consider the case where the
nominal growth rate is constant at n. Since the rate of change in prices is −r – in a
deflationary trap, real government debt grows at n + r – under these conditions. Thus,
if government debt is initially positive and n ≥ 0, it holds that
limate
–r –t > 0. (28)
t→ 
This implies that if nominal government debt outstanding is constant or growing, the
consumer’s transversality condition is not satisfied. Consequently, a deflationary trap
cannot be a solution. The economic intuition behind this is as follows. If inflation equal
to the rate of monetary growth does not occur, real assets held by consumers will
steadily increase. If this happens, consumers will tend to divert assets toward con-
sumption, and an increase in prices would be required to balance the supply and
demand for goods.
That said, if n −  ≥  , the growth rate of a will be at least as high as the growth
rate of m, and thus b will grow at the rate of n − . Under normal equilibrium, since
the minimum rate of growth in b is r – when n ≥   + r –, equation (17.a) is not 
satisfied. We follow McCallum (2001) and assume that in this case there would be a
loss of faith in government debt which brings government activity to a halt, and thus
that this is not a policy stance which the government could take.
13
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12. This extreme simplification means that physical capital is ignored in our model. When physical capital reaches a
stationary value, marginal increases in consumer assets and government liabilities are equalized, and thus with
minor modification our argument is equally applicable to an economy with physical capital.
13. The argument that the price level is determined in a way that satisfies the government’s transversality condition is
apparently equivalent to the fiscal theory of the price level. Such an argument can be found in Woodford (2001,
footnote 26).
Given that the fiscal theory of the price level posits a price level whereby prices adjust so that the transversality
condition of government debt a is satisfied, even when b is growing at a rate faster thanr –, the economy can attainLikewise, when n < 0 the transversality condition in equation (27) is satisfied, and
thus the development of a deflationary trap is not excluded.
14 In this case, all paths
that depart from the price level of P or lower corresponding to the level of m when
m . = 0 provide a solution, thus leading to real indeterminacy.
The above makes it clear that the presence of a deflationary trap depends upon
whether the nominal government debt outstanding is decreasing. The possibility 
that a deflationary trap could not be excluded based on the transversality condition
was pointed out more than a quarter-century ago by Brock (1975), who assumed
that a = m.
15 When the consumer’s transversality condition is not satisfied, govern-
ment debt tends to grow at a rate faster than the natural interest rate. This would be
termed a non-Ricardian regime.
16 In other words, to escape from a deflationary trap,
fiscal policy must be non-Ricardian. This has been pointed out by Woodford (2003),
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a), Takeda (2002), Nakajima (2002), and
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), among others. If m grows at a faster rate than 
−r – under a non-Ricardian regime (no change in b), m will instantly jump to the
point where m . = 0, as previously noted. This means the price level will also jump
when nominal money balances do not change.
Next, as shown in Figure 3, a different phase diagram can be drawn when   =− r –.
m .
t =− um(mt)mt. (29)
Based on the above equation, m . = 0 only holds under zero interest rates. This is
because the monetary growth rate and the inflation rate are equal, with both equal to
the natural interest rate times negative one. Under zero interest rates everything is a
solution, and with flexible prices the price level at the initial point (and along the
path beyond that) cannot be uniquely determined.
Finally, when   <− r –, in the entire region where m > 0, it is the case that m . < 0
and no solution exists, as shown in Figure 4.
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the normal equilibrium even in the region where n −   ≥  . This point highlights the difference between our
argument and the fiscal theory of the price level.
14. Even if real money balances were to grow at a rate above the natural interest rate, the government would offset
this by reducing net debt (with the government eventually becoming a net creditor to the private sector). This
would mean consumers were borrowing from the government to hold cash.
15. Brock (1975) did not assume that zero interest rates would develop once the utility from holding cash was 
satiated, and the basic thrust of his paper was on the indeterminacy of a solution.
16. This definition of government debt not meeting the transversality condition as a non-Ricardian fiscal policy
comes from Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a), Woodford (2001), and others. Woodford (1995)
defined a non-Ricardian fiscal policy stance as that when public debt held by the private sector does not satisfy
the transversality condition.14 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2005










Figure 4  Dynamic Path with Monetary Targeting (When   < –r –)
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m .The above makes it clear that a variety of solutions can be found depending on
the values of   and n. This relationship is summarized in Figure 5.
17
Holding growth in nominal debt constant is not the only fiscal policy rule.
Another possible rule is for the government to hold the real value of debt a constant.
This policy leads to a sustainable government budget, which implies the stability of
debt as a percentage of GDP.
18 By doing so, the transversality condition (16) is always
satisfied, and the path in which m becomes infinitely large cannot be excluded.
Another option would be to keep constant b, the real value of government bonds
held by the private sector. Since this would ensure that a and m move together, it is
equivalent to setting   = n when holding nominal growth in government debt con-
stant. In this case, if   ≥ 0, the transversality condition is not satisfied and solutions
with m growing infinitely large are excluded.
15
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Figure 5  When Emergence of a Deflationary Trap Is Possible
 














(emergence of a deflationary trap)
17. When m becomes infinitely large, the inflation rate is lower than the rate of monetary growth. Ono (1992,
2001), among others, attempted to explain the long-term slump in output by combining this phenomenon with
a version of the Phillips curve,
  =  +  [y − y –].
The assumption in these papers was that the marginal utility of money holdings had a positive minimum value,
such that m would accumulate even when   = 0. Although these papers emphasized that a lack of satiation of
money holdings was a cause of the long-term slump, Shibata (1993) showed that even with satiation, as long as
utility did not decline, a sustained slump like that identified by Ono (1992) would occur if   < 0. Since a 
perfectly natural assumption is that the minimum marginal utility on cash holdings is zero, the use of a Phillips
curve according to the above equation is essential to the occurrence of a sustained slump.
Be aware that, under the standard expectations augmented Phillips curve, with perfect foresight of the 
inflation rate, output is equal to y –, but because the monetary growth rate is contained in that portion of the
above equation corresponding to the expected inflation rate, even with perfect foresight of inflation, output could
deviate from y –.
18. There has been a considerable body of research on the sustainability of government budgets since Hamilton and
Flavin (1986). For an examination of the ratio of government debt to GDP, see Corsetti and Roubini (1991).Table 1 summarizes the fiscal policies and monetary targeting rules that would
lead to a deflationary trap based on the above arguments. To preclude a deflationary
trap when   >− r –, the government would have to commit to either holding the
nominal growth rate of government debt positive, or keeping the real value of 
privately held government bonds constant while ensuring positive nominal money
growth. In either case, when n =  , both government debt and money grow at the
same rate as inflation and thus their real values are held constant.
It is important to remember, however, that the real values are constant as a result
of the previous steps. The appearance of zero interest rates cannot be ruled out if
there is merely a commitment to hold the real value of government debt constant.
This is because taking such a fiscal policy stance in a deflationary environment would
reduce the nominal value of government debt and wind up satisfying the transver-
sality condition. Even under deflation, the transversality condition cannot be ruled
out without a commitment to not reduce the nominal value of government debt.
When applying the transversality conditions in (17.a) and (17.b), neither b nor m
are going to grow faster than r –. This implies a negative nominal rate of growth for
both b and m. It follows that the transversality condition would be met and that
growth in both nominal government debt and monetary growth would have to be
negative for a deflationary trap to appear. Thus, under the transversality conditions
in (17.a) and (17.b), the deflationary trap shown in Figure 4, when   ≥ 0, would 
disappear, and all solutions would be a normal equilibrium when   ≥ 0 in Table 1.
D. Fiscal Policies to Escape from a Deflationary Trap
We now consider an economy that is already in a deflationary trap to examine those
policies that would enable an escape from that trap. When considering such policies, it
is probably necessary to build a model that shows that economic welfare is higher under
normal equilibrium than under a deflationary trap. In this paper, however, we avoid
complicating the model to do that, and instead consider escape from a deflationary trap
as a given policy objective.
19
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Table 1  Fiscal Stance and the Presence of a Deflationary Trap
Nominal money growth rate ( ) held constant
  ≥ 00   >   >− r –
Real government debt (a) held constant Present
Government bonds owned by the private sector Absent Present (b) held constant in real terms
Growth in nominal government  n ≥ 0 Absent
debt (n) held constant n < 0 Present
19. Edmond (2002) cited the easing of borrowing constraints on the consumer and improved welfare as reasons why
inflation is desirable. When seigniorage is returned to the consumer through fixed subsidies, consumers facing a
borrowing constraint can shift consumption in a desirable direction by receiving the returns from seigniorage in
their younger years. He showed that, when shifting from deflation to inflation under zero interest rates, there is a
possibility that this positive effect would outweigh the negative effect from the opportunity cost of holding money.
Ireland (2001) found that when there is population growth, welfare declines under zero interest rates and
improves when zero interest rates are eliminated. In his model, however, the adverse impact on welfare comes from
the income transfer from the younger generation to the older generation, and the entire government debt is assumedUnder zero interest rates, even when keeping monetary growth at   > 0, inflation
will not occur and escape from a deflationary trap is impossible under a Ricardian 
fiscal policy regime. Under a non-Ricardian regime, however, it becomes possible to
create inflation and escape from a deflationary trap.
20 All that is required of this non-
Ricardian fiscal regime is a commitment to not reduce nominal government debt.
This commitment cannot be kept under deflation, but under other conditions it is
consistent with maintaining prudent fiscal discipline, without any destructive fiscal
expansion.
21 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000), for example, show that a balanced
budget would belong to such a non-Ricardian fiscal policy regime.
Next, we assume the economy has already fallen into a deflationary trap and 
consider the policies required to exit that trap as well as their consequences.
22 We 
can start by looking at the Ricardian regime of holding government debt a constant
while in a deflationary trap. In this case, prices would decline at the rate of −r –, as 
would nominal government debt. The government would change policy to exit the
deflationary trap, making a commitment to not reduce nominal government debt 
(a non-Ricardian regime) during the deflationary trap. This would mean a tax cut.
Nevertheless, to ensure a solution with a normal equilibrium, fiscal discipline 
(a Ricardian regime) is required, holding government debt a constant under normal
equilibrium. Thus, the new policy rule requires a non-Ricardian regime under certain
circumstances (only when in a deflationary trap).
If economic agents find this commitment to pursue new policies credible, the 
deflationary trap would not satisfy the transversality condition and therefore not be 
a solution. Further restricting our focus to a policy of holding the size of the tax cut
17
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to be in the form of money. If the government held assets in the same amount as the money balance and the 
government’s net debt was zero, there would be no intergenerational transfer of income and thus no deterioration
in welfare.
Without flexible prices, either inflation or deflation would result in erroneous pricing and cause a misallocation
of resources. Based on this reason, Woodford (2003) showed that it was desirable to stabilize prices (bring the 
inflation rate to zero) to prevent this disruption of the pricing mechanism.
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), on the other hand, emphasized that when prices are downwardly rigid,
the long-run Phillips curve ceases to be vertical and that a higher income level can be maintained over the long
term by keeping a positive rate of inflation.
20. Evans and Honkapohja (2003) pointed out that the appropriate fiscal policy approach for exiting a deflationary
trap depends on whether the formation of expectations is rational or adaptive. Under rational expectations, a
deflationary trap is a stable equilibrium and a sunspot solution emerges when pursuing Ricardian policies. Under
adaptive learning, in contrast, such learning is impossible with Ricardian policies, and thus there is no need 
to give much thought to the formation of a deflationary trap equilibrium. There is a possibility, however, of
deflation becoming deeper than in a deflationary trap. Under a non-Ricardian regime, in contrast, learning is
possible and it becomes easier for a deflationary trap to form.
The model used by Evans and Honkapohja (2003) does not include a transversality condition on consumer
behavior and thus has no mechanism to rule out solutions based on such a condition. For this reason, they
believe that a Ricardian regime is preferable for exiting a deflationary trap and maintain that monetary policy
must be changed before the inflation rate declines to deflationary trap levels.
21. Within the realm of the fiscal theory of the price level, there are proponents of massively expansionary fiscal policy
aimed at causing prices to increase, but Kawagoe and Hirose (2003) take a negative view of this, maintaining that
such fiscal expansion does nothing more than provoke higher interest rates by raising the risk premium. We take
the same position as Kawagoe and Hirose (2003) in this paper.
22. Another approach is the consideration of a policy rule to avoid a deflationary trap, as in Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohé, and Uribe (2002a). They attempt to avoid falling into a deflationary trap by establishing a policy rule
inconsistent with the transversality condition ahead of time, while on a deflationary trap path. The solution thus
achieved is therefore a consistent policy rule. Our approach differs in that we want to analyze the conditions 
prevailing after having already fallen into a deflationary trap, so we assume an initial policy that is compatible
with a deflationary trap and then suppose a subsequent policy change.constant when policy is changed, together with the central bank maintaining a 
constant rate of monetary growth, the new policy rule we consider here can be expressed
with three parameters: the new government debt, the monetary growth rate, and the
tax cut size. With the government setting the parameters correctly to achieve the infla-
tion target under normal equilibrium, as long as transversality is satisfied under normal
equilibrium, the economy should quickly reach its new normal equilibrium.
The policy parameters are chosen as follows. The government’s budget constraint
under a deflationary trap ( 0 =− r –) can be written as
ra0 = 0. (30)
Once out of the deflationary trap, the budget constraint changes to
ra1 −im1 = 1. (31)
Here, m1 is the real money balance that equates to money demand with nominal
interest rate i. Assuming that the real value a of government debt (including govern-
ment bonds held by the central bank) does not change around the time of the policy
change,
23 then 
 0 − 1 = im1. (32)
The amount of tax cut required to exit the deflationary trap is given by the new 
nominal interest rate and money balance attained. The tax cut corresponds to the
amount of increase in the BOJ’s payments to the national treasury. This would mean
no change in the primary balance.
We now estimate how large a money-financed tax cut would be given Japan’s 
current conditions. From equation (32), this can be expressed with two parameters,
the nominal interest rate and the monetary base following exit from the deflationary
trap. Using the well-known Taylor rule, 
i = 0.04 + 0.5(  − 0.02), (33)
we set an inflation rate of 2 percent, a nominal interest rate of 4 percent, and a natural
interest rate of 2 percent.
24 Accordingly, in a deflationary trap the nominal interest 
rate would be zero and the inflation rate –2 percent, values close to what they currently
are in Japan. One way to determine the monetary base corresponding to a 4 percent 
nominal interest rate is to estimate using a money demand function, but there is
another way, and that is to check the historical values of the monetary base when 
the nominal interest rate was at 4 percent. In keeping with our objective of making it
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23. A model that assumes no instantaneous adjustments to nominal government debt also presupposes no instantaneous
adjustments to the price level. We consider this a natural constraint that limits the range of policies.
24. The values in equation (33) have been widely used since Taylor (1993). It is normally written with not only the
inflation rate but also the output gap as explanatory variables, but we have simplified it here by ignoring the 
output gap.easy to grasp estimation steps, we will use the latter approach. As shown in Figure 1,
during the declining phase of interest rates in the early 1990s, short-term interest rates
dropped below 4 percent in February 1992. Figure 6 shows that the monetary base was
stable around this time, averaging ¥39 trillion between August 1991 and July 1992. We
can therefore say that the monetary base which corresponded to a nominal interest rate
of 4 percent in 1992 was ¥39 trillion. The current monetary base must be thought of
in the context of this amount plus the natural growth in GDP. In the post-bubble year
of 1992, economic activity was neither exceptionally strong nor exceptionally weak,
and GDP was deemed to be at roughly its natural level, so such an approach should not
produce any large errors. An estimate of the natural rate of growth in GDP from 1992
until 2002 would vary widely depending on whether the slow growth in the 1990s is
blamed on supply-side factors or demand-side factors, and opinions differ widely on
this issue. In light of this, we have adopted the middle road in this paper, setting both
an upper limit and a lower limit on the natural GDP growth rate. For the upper limit,
we use the real GDP growth rate of 3.4 percent that was achieved in the 1980s prior to
the bubble (1980–86). Assuming no output gap in 1992, this would mean an output
gap of 20 percent in 2002. For the lower limit, we use the actual rate of real GDP
growth from 1992 to 2002 of 1.1 percent. This would be equivalent to assuming an
output gap of zero in 2002. Furthermore, the annual change in the GDP deflator from
fiscal 1992 until fiscal 2002 was 0.8 percent. Under these two extremes, the monetary
base of ¥39 trillion in 1992 extrapolates to between ¥40.2 trillion and ¥51.5 trillion in
2003.
25 Using this asm in equation (32) and multiplying byi =4 percent, the required
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25. Our actual calculation for the minimum figure was to multiply ¥39 trillion by the ratio of fiscal 2002 nominal GDP
(¥499.1 trillion) to fiscal 1992 nominal GDP (¥483.6 trillion). For the maximum figure, we took the ratio of the
fiscal 2002 GDP deflator (real GDP divided by nominal GDP) to the fiscal 1992 GDP deflator, multiplied that by
11/6 times the ratio of fiscal 1986 real GDP (¥379.8 trillion) to fiscal 1980 real GDP (¥311.9 trillion), and then
multiplied that by ¥39 trillion.
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Monetary basetax cut comes to ¥1.6–2.1 trillion. With an interest rate hike of 3 percentage points,
the tax cut would be ¥1.2–1.5 trillion.
The following is a conceivable exit strategy when the economy is in a deflationary
trap. Fiscal policymakers begin with a commitment to prevent negative nominal
growth in government debt and coordinate with the central bank a money-financed tax
cut (or possibly a “helicopter drop” by the central bank alone). Using the above calcu-
lations, the required tax cut would be a maximum of approximately ¥2 trillion. An area
of concern with a money-financed tax cut without strict rules in place is the ease with
which this could wind up resulting in the central bank underwriting government
bonds. Nevertheless, critical to coordination between fiscal policymakers and the 
central bank is the formation of a common expectation for the new inflation rate. If 
the fiscal authorities expect inflation to climb higher, they will have leeway to grow 
the nominal value of government debt in accord with inflation when holding the real
value of government debt constant. Because nominal interest rates increase, however,
interest payments on government bonds go up. When inflation increases by the same
amount as nominal interest rates (i.e., real interest rates are constant), the two are 
perfectly offset. The other factor affecting the government’s budget constraint is the
change in payments into the national treasury by the BOJ. Since nominal interest rates
are higher, these payments—which are government revenues—increase, creating 
leeway for a tax cut of the same amount. Stated differently, the tax cut is funded by 
the increase in central bank payments into the treasury resulting from the increase 
in inflation (nominal interest rates). This is fine as long as the central bank purchases
government bonds on the open market to ensure monetary growth at the rate of  .
When nominal interest rates increase, real money balances must decline, and thus
there must be a large, instantaneous increase in prices. Our model assumes flexible
prices, so such a jump in prices presents no problems within the model. Realistically,
however, it is probably best to avoid such a dramatic increase in prices. To do this, the
central bank could engage in selling operations to lower nominal money balances and
achieve the new real money balance without a jump in prices. Auernheimer (1974)
termed such a policy aimed at preventing a jump in prices an “honest government 
policy.” The above scenario would lead to changes in the main economic variables as
shown in Figure 7.
We can now attempt to apply the above argument to the reductio ad absurdum
described by Bernanke (2000, p. 158). Bernanke says that if monetary growth did
not lead to higher prices, the government could reap infinitely large revenues from
seigniorage with which it would be able to buy goods and assets, but since such a
state could not be an equilibrium, monetary growth would impact the price level.
Thinking in terms of equation (8), if seigniorage goes up, either government bonds
b held by the private sector are reduced, or taxes can be reduced (demand for goods
from the government is ruled out in this model). If the choice is to cut taxes, it
would become a non-Ricardian fiscal policy that, as we have shown, would affect
prices and produce a result consistent with Bernanke’s argument. If on the other
hand there is a reduction in privately held government bonds and the policy satisfies
the transversality condition (27), there would be no impact on prices and Bernanke’s
argument would not apply.
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Figure 7  Changes in Economic Variables When Interest Rates Are Raised 














lnPE. Applicability to the Japanese Economy
Is it accurate to characterize Japan’s current economic situation as a deflationary trap
as defined in Section II.C? When the government adopts a fiscal policy stance aimed
at reducing nominal debt, it renders the quantity theory of money inapplicable.
However, Japan’s fiscal deficit is extraordinarily high relative to other industrialized
countries, and the amount of increase in nominal debt is also quite large. As depicted
in Figure 5, a deflationary trap cannot occur when growth in nominal government
debt is positive. Accordingly, it would be possible to argue that the fiscal authorities
have adopted policies aimed at avoiding a deflationary trap, and that Japan is not
“trapped” at present.
On the other hand, it is also possible to interpret Japan’s current situation as a
deflationary trap by emphasizing the point made in Section II.C that characterizes a
deflationary trap as sustained deflation despite growth in nominal money balances. In
this case, there are a number of ways to reconcile the theory with the current fiscal
policy stance.
First, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) pointed out that a large quantity of 
Japanese government bonds (JGBs) is held by government agencies other than the 
central bank, including the postal savings system, postal insurance, and public pension
funds, and that there is a huge discrepancy between the quantity of government debt
held by the private sector and the amount of government bonds that have been issued.
Figure 8, which shows the total amount of JGB issuance and the amount of JGBs 
held privately as a percentage of GDP, shows clearly that private holdings—recently
around 40 percent of GDP—have not shown the same rapid growth as total issuance.
Second, it may be possible to argue that the government has yet to make a clear com-
mitment to escape from the deflationary trap. In fact, the government’s commitment
to fiscal sustainability could also be interpreted as a commitment to reduce nominal
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JGBs outstanding
Private-sector holdingsgovernment debt if deflation continues. According to this line of reasoning, what 
is needed now is a clear statement by the fiscal authorities that they will not reduce
nominal debt if deflation continues.
Eggertsson (2003) proposes two ways for the government to clarify its commitment:
increase spending (or cut taxes) to inflate the fiscal deficit, and engage in open market
operations to purchase real assets and overseas assets. These policies would amount 
to the government attempting to decrease the real value of the government debt by 
triggering inflation. If fiscal policymakers and the central bank were to cooperate in an
attempt to maximize a common objective function, this “inflation incentive” would be
reflected in central bank policy. This would create inflation expectations in the private
sector, actually produce inflation, and lead to a rise in output. But if the government
and the central bank do not cooperate and the central bank maximizes an independent
objective function, inflation expectations would not form. Eggertsson (2003) interprets
the lack of inflation despite the large quantity of JGB issuance under zero interest rates
as evidence of a lack of cooperation between treasury officials and the central bank.
Third, given that consumers act without perfect foresight on an infinite horizon, it
could be argued that the transversality condition on government debt is not included
in the model. We expect, however, that such an interpretation would be criticized as
arbitrarily assuming bounded rationality of the consumer. A promising area for future
research would be to examine the impact that the transversality condition has on price
level determination, based on a widely used type of bounded rationality (adaptive 
learning, for example).
III. Short-Run Adjustments
A. The Impact from Lagged Adjustments in the Inflation Rate
In Section II, we assumed flexible prices and output always at its natural level. In this
section, because prices are sticky in the short run, we consider situations in which
output diverges from its natural level.
This assumption of price rigidity affects the options for escaping from a deflationary
trap in the following ways. Using the Fischer equation as a starting point,
i = r +  , (34)
when prices are flexible, the real interest rate is equal to the natural interest rate.
Assuming these are both constant, the inflation rate and nominal interest rates
increase on a one-for-one basis. Accordingly, an increase in nominal interest rates is
immediately reflected as an increase in the inflation rate. When the inflation rate
does not respond immediately, on the other hand, an increase in the nominal interest
rate causes the real interest rate to rise in the short run, only to return to the level 
of the natural interest rate over time. Since an increase in the real interest rate pushes
income lower, income declines in the short run. Because this scenario entails a 
temporary monetary tightening, we expect that actual implementation would meet
stiff resistance.
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self-sustained increase in demand, which would lower the real interest rate and raise
the inflation rate, accompanied by a hike in nominal interest rates. Although raising
the nominal interest rate by itself has a contractionary effect, it would probably be
supported as a stabilization policy. Because an autonomous increase in demand is, by
definition, independent of monetary policy, this scenario is not a policy-driven escape
from a deflationary trap, but rather an escape achieved through factors exogenous to
monetary policy.
Consequently, it is the first scenario that merits a further analysis. The problem
revolves around how much income would decline when attempting an escape from a
deflationary trap by changing only monetary policy. We consider this problem in
Section III.
B. Twenty Types of Dynamic Models
A critical dispute in the field of macroeconomics concerns the theoretical framework
for explaining the short-term fluctuations that arise from price rigidities. Although
economists are closer to agreement now than they have ever been, there is not yet
agreement on a single model.
When there is imperfect understanding of actual economic fluctuations, there is
always the risk that selection of an optimal monetary policy under a specific model
will bring undesirable results if that model does not present an accurate picture of
reality. With this in mind, McCallum (1988) ran an analysis that attempted to assess
the consequences of monetary policy rules under multiple conceivable models.
26 In a
similar spirit, we consider the short-term fluctuations that would occur under models
of differing characteristics when applying the policy scenarios discussed in Section II.
Therefore, our objective here is not to focus on those models that provide the closest
approximation to reality, but rather to select models that accommodate the widest
possible range of characteristics through simple combinations of settings. Of course,
not all of the models capable of explaining reality are included. If those models we
have neglected exhibit the same dynamic characteristics as the models we included,
they should be thought of as effectively analyzed here, albeit represented by simpler
models to facilitate analysis.
We consider a dynamic model that represents price adjustments occurring over
time. The model is described by three equations, and we consider alternative versions
of each.
We consider the following two forms for the demand side:
y.
t =  [it − t −r –],     > 0. (A.1)
yt − y – =−  [it − t −r –],     > 0. (A.2)
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26. Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) took this approach a step further by considering prior probabilities for different
models, and showed a way to evaluate policies under model uncertainty based on decision theory.Derived by Kerr and King (1996) and others, (A.1) is a linear approximation of the
Euler equation, where c = y. This is also called the expectational IS curve in Kerr and
King (1996). (A.2) is the classic IS curve, and implies that when real interest rates are
high, income is below its natural level. (A.1) is based on inter-temporal utility maxi-
mizing behavior, as is the model in Section II. This differs from (A.2), which cannot
be thought of as a simple extension of Section II. When solving forward for (A.1),
current income is expressed as a decreasing function of real long-term interest rates,
so it is possible to think of the difference between (A.1) and (A.2) as being whether
the impact of future short-term interest rates on current demand is taken into
account. As will be made clear below, this does not make a critical difference to the
thrust of this paper.
We consider three versions of the equation representing the change in prices.
  .
t =−  [yt −y –],     > 0. (B.1)
  .
t = [yt −y –],     > 0. (B.2)
 t −  – = [yt −y –],     > 0. (B.3)
(B.1) is the price adjustment function from Calvo (1983), and is based on the
assumption that firms have an opportunity to adjust prices each period by a given
percentage. Since the opportunity to change prices is limited, firms are assumed to
set prices based on their future marginal costs. During cyclical fluctuations, assuming
that some production factors are fixed and the variable production factors generate
diminishing returns, an increase in production would lead to higher marginal costs,
and thus the gap in output between the present and the future would have a positive
effect on current prices. Solving (B.1) forward makes this relationship clear. The
price adjustment mechanism used by Calvo (1983) was reformulated into discrete
time by Roberts (1995) as follows.
 t = [yt −y –] +Et t+1. (35)
This is the now widely used equation called the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
27
Here, Et is the expected value based on information accumulated in period t. Since
(B.1) and (35) have essentially the same characteristics within our framework, we will
refer to (B.1) as the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
(B.2), a formulation dating back to early studies of the Phillips curve, like Gordon
(1970) and Solow (1969), that showed the persistence of inflation, implies that 
when income is high the inflation rate tends to increase. This is known as the acceler-
ationist Phillips curve (in the Japanese literature, such as Higo and Nakada [2000] 
and Watanabe [1997], it is called the NAIRU [non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment]-type Phillips curve). Solving (B.2) backward, we see that the current
25
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27. As argued in Woodford (2003), the application of micro foundations leads to a coefficient for expected inflation
other than one.inflation rate is affected by the past output gap and responds by moving in the same
direction. While (B.2) is a backward-looking model, (B.1) is forward looking in regard
to price adjustments. Although the recent trend has favored the use of forward-looking
models, it is recognized that simple forward-looking models do not necessarily match
the empirical data. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) consider a hybrid model with both 
forward-looking and backward-looking elements, and Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2003)
attempt to build micro foundations into a backward-looking model.
Equation (B.3) is the classic Phillips curve, which shows that when incomes are
high the inflation rate is high.
The last equation concerns the monetary policy rule, and assumes that the central
bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inflation. Since the real interest
rate shows up as a variable on the demand side, monetary policy can be considered in
two different forms, as follows.
r′( ) > 0. (C.1)
r′( ) < 0. (C.2)
Equation (C.1) implies a policy rule whereby, when the inflation rate rises, the
nominal interest rate is raised even higher to ensure an increase in the real interest
rate. Leeper (1991) calls this an active monetary policy. The Taylor (1993) rule is
included in this type of monetary policy. Nevertheless, such a rule comes up against
the zero bound on interest rates. That is, when the inflation rate becomes low and
interest rates reach zero, it becomes impossible to lower nominal interest rates 
further, even with further declines in the inflation rate, and thus the real interest 
rate ends up rising. Accordingly, when constructing a phase diagram, we consider
r′( ) < 0 when   is low. Equation (C.2) implies a policy rule whereby, even under
rising inflation, the increase in the nominal interest rate is moderate enough that the
real interest rate declines. Termed a passive monetary policy by Leeper (1991), this
includes interest rate targeting and a ZIRP.
In Section II, we examined a monetary policy in which nominal money growth
was held constant, but in Section III we look at nominal interest rates as a function
of inflation. Although the settings in Section III are close to actual monetary policy
rules, under flexible prices policies that target nominal interest rates and policies that
target nominal money growth are essentially the same outside of a deflationary trap,
so the model in Section II is not limiting.
The model in Section III does not show a and m explicitly. With this in mind, we
first consider a Ricardian fiscal regime and analyze the model assuming that the
transversality condition is always satisfied. Under these conditions, we find that a
deflationary trap is a possible equilibrium under zero interest rates. Thus the models
in Sections II and III share the same challenge, which is finding a policy that will
provide an escape from a deflationary trap after falling into it.
Substituting (C) into (A) leaves the model with two variables, y and  . There are
six conceivable combinations of (A) and (B), but we can exclude the combination of
(A.2) and (B.3), since it is not a dynamic model. Adding to this the equations in (C),
26 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2005we now have 10 possible combinations. Further considering that   could be either a
state variable or a jumping variable gives us the possibility of 20 different types of
dynamic models.
These models include some representative models that are widely used in macro-
economics. A combination of the expectational IS curve in (A.1), the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in (B.2), and the Taylor rule in (C.1), under the assumption that the
inflation rate can jump at the initial point, has recently become a commonly used 
theoretical framework for examining monetary policy that was used, e.g., by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1999). Additionally, the combination of the IS curve in (A.2), the
accelerationist Phillips curve in (B.2), and the Taylor rule in (C.1), with inflation
assumed to be a state variable, is a model seen in newer undergraduate-level textbooks,
starting with Taylor (1998).
28
We conduct our dynamic analysis based on the following assumptions. First, we
look at the dynamic structure of the model assuming that the government adopts 
a Ricardian fiscal regime and that a deflationary trap is a possible solution. Next, 
we examine how the economy behaves assuming that, after a deflationary trap has
developed, policy is changed to exit the trap by adopting a non-Ricardian regime,
thereby excluding a deflationary trap from the set of possible solutions. As in Section
II, under a deflationary trap a non-Ricardian regime could be implemented with a 
combination of a money-financed tax cut and an interest rate hike implemented at 
the time of the policy change, but since the budget constraints of the consumer and the
government are not explicitly written, the tax cut does not show up in the model. We
also consider in Section III situations where a policy change that is not non-Ricardian
in nature is needed.
C. When Inflation Is a State Variable
Phase diagrams expressing the 10 combinations of (A), (B), and (C) are shown in
Figure 9, with the inflation rate on the vertical axis and level of output on the 
horizontal axis. Each phase diagram is drawn as described below.
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28. When emphasizing that (B.1) is a forward-looking model and (B.2) a backward-looking model, this model is
open to criticism for a lack of theoretical consistency, since the inflation rate is given as an initial condition in
(B.1) but can jump in (B.2). Nevertheless, our objective is to examine the robustness of policy scenarios, so we
have chosen to use a variety of models rather than narrow our focus to models based on theoretical consistency.28 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2005
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y = 0 .In models with (A.1), since at a given inflation rate y.
t =  [r( t) − r –] = 0, the 
curve y. = 0 is represented by a horizontal line. To achieve a normal equilibrium, the
monetary policy rule must be set so that such a horizontal line results when inflation is
positive. Under active monetary policy rules, there is also a need to consider the impact
of the zero bound on interest rates. The relationship between interest rates and the
inflation rate can be expressed as in Figure 10 [1], with the nominal interest rate on the
vertical axis and the inflation rate on the horizontal axis. Under an active monetary 
policy rule, the nominal interest rate is lowered by more than the decline in the 
inflation rate, and thus the line connecting E and F slopes at an angle steeper than 
45 degrees. The 45-degree slope connecting E toG shows the relationship between 
the nominal interest rate and inflation under natural interest rates, and the intersection
of the two lines at E is the normal equilibrium. Under an active monetary policy rule,
when a decline in inflation brings interest rates to zero as in F, further declines in 
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Figure 9  (continued)
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  = 0 .
  = 0 .inflation cause the real interest rate to rise, even with the nominal rate held to zero.
Figure 10 [2] shows the relationship between the real interest rate and inflation, and
indicates that an active monetary policy rule is followed when inflation is higher than
the point at F where interest rates are zero, but must be passive when the inflation rate
is lower than F because of the zero bound on interest rates. In models with equation
(A.1), y. =0 when the inflation rate is E orG, y. < 0 when it lies between E and G, and
y. > 0 when it is either higher thanE or lower than G.
In models with (A.2), substituting (C) into (A.2) yields a solution curve. Under
an active monetary policy rule, the real interest rate is reduced by lowering the 
nominal interest rate by an amount greater than the decline in the inflation rate, and
because output increases, the curve is downward sloping. Nevertheless, under zero
interest rates, a decline in inflation causes the real interest rate to go up and output to
decline. Therefore, as shown in Figure 9 [4] and [5], the curve is downward sloping
under positive interest rates and upward sloping under negative interest rates. This is
30 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2005







i(  )  
r = natural interest rate
[1] Response of Nominal Interest Rate to Inflation
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[2] Response of Real Interest Rate to Inflationbecause an increase in inflation causes an increase in the real interest rate under a 
passive monetary policy rule. This is shown by the upward slope of the curve.
In models with (B.1) and (B.2), the   . = 0 curve appears vertical at y = y –. In models
with equation (B.3), the upward-sloping Phillips curve becomes a solution curve.
Based on the above arguments, we draw the y. = 0 and   . = 0 curves in each phase
diagram to be able to check for the properties of the solution.
When   is a state variable and equilibrium is not a saddle point, there are either
an infinite number of solutions or there is no solution. When a unique solution exists
with the right choice of monetary policy rule, we assume that such a monetary policy
was chosen. If so, of the five combinations of equations (A) and (B), we select the
monetary polices that produce a saddle-point equilibrium. The results of this are
shown in Table 2.
The behavior of the economy can be divided into two types. In the first, there is a
positive correlation between inflation and output, and the economy converges on a
long-run equilibrium (in response to the Phillips curve relationship). This behavior
occurs under either the New Keynesian Phillips curve (B.1) or the classic Phillips curve
(B.3), irrespective of the shape of the IS curve, and implies the selection of monetary
policy (C.2). In the second, there is a negative correlation between inflation and 
output, and the economy converges on a long-run equilibrium (in response to the 
positive interest rate level). This behavior occurs under the accelerationist Phillips 
curve (B.2), irrespective of the shape of the IS curve, and implies the selection of 
monetary policy (C.1).
Kerr and King (1996), using a New Keynesian Phillips curve under a Ricardian
regime, are able to obtain a unique, rational expectations equilibrium with an active
monetary policy, but show that equilibrium is indeterminate with a passive monetary
policy. Unlike Kerr and King (1996), we are able to obtain a unique solution under a
passive monetary policy rule in models that contain (B.1). This is because we model
inflation as a state variable, which gives the model completely different dynamic
characteristics. In this paper, although we confine ourselves to a Ricardian regime, 
we look at monetary policy rules and the problem of indeterminacy using a much
wider framework, including treating inflation as a state variable and assuming an
31
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t =−  [yt − y –] (C.2)   r ′( ) < 0
New Keynesian Positive correlation between   and y
Phillips curve
(B.3)
 t −   – =  [yt − y –]
Phillips curve
(B.2) (C.1)   r ′( ) > 0  
.
t =  [yt − y –] Negative correlation between   and y Accelerationist Also, a deflationary spiral under zero interest rates Phillips curveaccelerationist Phillips curve, than what has been considered in the recent literature.
When including the accelerationist Phillips curve (B.3), a unique solution is possible
under an active monetary policy, but note that this is in agreement with Kerr and 
King (1996) only as to the conclusion; the Phillips curve and the initial settings for
the inflation rate are different, and the dynamic characteristics of the models are 
completely different.
Be aware of the economy’s behavior under monetary policy (C.1) when inflation
declines and interest rates reach zero. In the combination (A.1) and (B.2), as the 
economy approaches equilibrium at zero interest rates and output at its natural level
(hereinafter the zero interest rate equilibrium
29), the dynamic system has complex roots,
and whether this is a stable sink or an unstable source depends on the parameters for
the IS curve and the Phillips curve. Under certain parameters, the zero interest rate
equilibrium is a sink. Given that the absolute value of the unique root in the dynamic
system when approaching equilibrium is   r′( ), it is possible to change the 
equilibrium to a source by increasing the absolute value of r′( ). Since a monetary 
policy rule becomes passive in the neighborhood of the zero interest rate equilibrium,
this amplifies the increase in the real interest rate that accompanies the decline in the
inflation rate. By doing this, it is possible to change the equilibrium to a source. Thus,
in the phase diagram shown in Figure 11, it is possible to choose a path that converges
on a normal equilibrium for a wide range of initial inflation rates.
30
Under the combination (A.2) and (B.2), when output falls below its natural level
under zero interest rates, there is also a possibility of a deflationary spiral, in which both
the inflation rate and output decline without bound. The possibility of a deflationary
spiral in such a model has been shown by Iwata (2002), Kaizuka (2002), Reifschneider
and Williams (2000), and Taylor (2000).
D. When Inflation Is Not a State Variable
When the inflation rate adjusts instantaneously, on the other hand, the following can be
said. Since in this case neither   nor y is a state variable, unless the equilibrium is a
unique source, a unique solution cannot be obtained. In this case, both  and y imme-
diately jump to equilibrium and stay there. When such a solution is possible depending
on the monetary policy rule chosen, we assume that the rule enabling the solution is 
chosen. With either (B.1) or (B.3) in the model, however, a saddle-point equilibrium is
possible irrespective of the monetary policy chosen. If the equilibrium becomes a saddle
point and the initial terms of the two variables are not given, at any point along the 
saddle-point path, all the paths converging to the saddle point are a solution. That is,
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29. In Section II, we defined a deflationary trap as a condition in which zero interest rates and deflation are persistent
and the quantity theory of money does not hold. Since we do not specify the rate of monetary growth in Section
III, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the quantity theory of money holds under a zero interest rate
equilibrium. Although the difference is only slight, to keep the distinction clear in our terminology, when zero
interest rates become an equilibrium in the dynamic system in Section III, we use the term zero interest rate 
equilibrium. Since zero interest rate equilibria include a deflationary trap, in Section III it is possible to interpret
an exit from a deflationary trap as an exit from a zero interest rate equilibrium.
30. Depending on the parameter settings, a periodic solution is possible. Although they use a model that differs 
substantially in structure, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002b) analyze the possibility of a periodic 
solution. Using an interest rate rule in which the current interest rate is set based on the past rate, they showed
that a periodic solution cannot be ruled out if the coefficient for the past rate is less than one, but it can be
excluded if it is larger than one.this effectively gives rise to indeterminacy.
31 The combinations including either (B.1) 
or (B.3) effectively lead to indeterminacy irrespective of the monetary policy chosen.
The passive monetary policy (C.2) leads to a saddle point under positive interest rates.
In contrast, under an active monetary policy (C.1), a source is possible under positive
interest rates, but when interest rates reach zero, monetary policy effectively becomes
passive, and thus a saddle point develops just as with (C.2). In this paper, we view the
ability to generate a source under positive interest rates as an advantage, and assume that
(C.1) is selected.
32 Based on the above argument, Table 3 shows the optimal monetary
policy choice for the five combinations of (A) and (B).
33
Monetary and Fiscal Policy to Escape from a DeflationaryTrap







y = 0 .
= 0 .
31. Calvo (1983) showed that the combination (A.1), (B.1), and (C.2) leads to real indeterminacy.
32. Kerr and King (1996) showed that there was a unique solution for the combination (A.1), (B.1), and (C.1) when
ignoring the possibility of zero interest rates, and our argument coincides with this.
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t =  [yt − y –] (C.2)   r ′( ) < 0
Accelerationist Instantaneous adjustment to normal equilibrium
Phillips curveThe economy’s behavior can be divided into two types. In combinations of (A)
and (B), the two behaviors are divided in the same way as when the inflation rate
does not adjust immediately. That is, the same behavior occurs for both (A.1) and
(A.2), and it is the selection of (B) that determines the economy’s behavior. With
(B.2), monetary policy (C.2) is selected and the economy immediately jumps to a
unique normal equilibrium. Accordingly, in this case it can be assumed that the
behavior is the same as in a model with flexible prices. When either (B.1) or (B.3) is
selected, the economy could go toward either of two equilibria, and the settings 
chosen here do not determine which. One equilibrium is a source under positive
interest rates, and one solution is for the economy to immediately jump to this 
equilibrium. The other equilibrium is a saddle point under zero interest rates.
E. Exiting from Zero Interest Rates
Next, we look at the situation when the economy attains, from among the patterns
outlined in Tables 2 and 3, a zero interest rate equilibrium, and consider how to exit
that equilibrium.
(1) We start by looking at the situation when a zero interest rate equilibrium
develops owing to the interest rate level having fallen too low under a passive
monetary policy rule, as shown in Figure 12 [1]. In this case, if interest rates
are raised as in Figure 12 [2], it becomes possible to reach a normal equilib-
rium. Figure 13 shows the combination (A.1), (B.2), and (C.2) when inflation
is not a state variable, representing with a dotted line the curve y. = 0 when the
money policy rule is consistent with the zero interest rate equilibrium, and
representing with a solid line the same curve when the monetary policy rule is
consistent with the normal equilibrium. In this case, when interest rates are
raised, the inflation rate rises by exactly the amount of the interest rate hike,
and the economy immediately jumps from the zero interest rate equilibrium
E0 to the new equilibrium E1. Similarly, under the combination (A.2), (B.2),
and (C.2), the economy immediately moves to a normal equilibrium. Because
this is the same behavior as under flexible prices, there is no need to consider
additional elements in the adjustment process.
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y = 0 .
y = 0 .
  = 0 .(2) There are three potential combinations under a passive monetary policy rule
when inflation is a state variable: (A.1) and (B.1), (A.1) and (B.3), and (A.2)
and (B.1). The saddle path toward equilibrium has the same dynamic charac-
teristics in all three. In this case as well, it is possible to attain a normal 
equilibrium if interest rates are raised as in Figure 12 [2]. Figure 14 shows how
the economy reacts to the policy change. We assume first that the economy is
at the zero interest rate equilibrium E0. The economy’s dynamics are changed
when interest rates are raised, and the new saddle path shifts upward. Because
the inflation rate does not adjust instantaneously, however, output must first
be lowered to get on the new saddle path. Subsequently, inflation gradually
rises, and output returns to its natural level. In other words, if interest rates are
raised to increase inflation, since the inflation rate does not adjust immedi-
ately, the real interest rate rises temporarily and causes output to decline. This
is an additional element to consider in the adjustment process.
(3) Under an active monetary policy with inflation not a state variable, the zero
interest rate equilibrium is a saddle point, and an infinite number of solutions 
converging on this point exist. This is the state described by Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a), and if a fiscal policy stance violates the
transversality condition, the economy immediately moves to a normal equilib-
rium that is a source. Here again, the economy behaves in the same way as
under flexible prices when adopting the same policy prescriptions, and thus
there is no need to consider additional elements in the adjustment process.
Another theoretically conceivable way out of a deflationary trap is to change
the monetary policy rule and raise the interest rate when inflation is low, as
shown in Figure 15. In this case, there will no longer be a nominal interest 
rate that accommodates both deflation and the natural rate of interest, the only
equilibrium will be at pointE, and the economy will quickly move to that point,
which is a normal equilibrium. Furthermore, the elimination of deflation 
will result in an increase in treasury payments from the central bank, thereby
creating room for a tax cut by the government even when holding government
36 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2005
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  = 0 .debt constant. Therefore, there is no difference in the variable movements that
result between escaping from deflation by pursuing non-Ricardian fiscal policies
and by doing so with monetary policy as in Figure 15. Outside of equilibrium,
the policy approaches become different.
Under the rule shown by Figure 15, however, there is a large, discontinuous
change in nominal interest rates, and at the point of discontinuity the decline
in inflation brings an increase in the nominal interest rate. Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohé, and Uribe (2001) questioned the plausibility of implementing such 
a policy. If non-Ricardian fiscal policies are not effective, however, it seems 
worthwhile to consider a policy of raising interest rates. As argued in Section
II.E, it is also possible to view Japan’s current fiscal stance as non-Ricardian in
nature. There is no reason why only one of these policies can be adopted, and it
would also be workable to both adopt a non-Ricardian fiscal regime and hike
interest rates via a change in rules as shown in Figure 15.
(4) Under an active monetary policy with inflation as a state variable, there are two
possible dynamic behaviors. In the first, with the combination of (A.2), (B.2),
and (C.1), the zero interest rate equilibrium is a source and thus unstable, but
with this combination ruled out, the economy converges on a path toward a 
normal equilibrium, as shown in Figure 9. If the inflation rate departs only
slightly from its level at the zero interest rate equilibrium, the economy will 
converge on a path toward the normal equilibrium, and thus the likelihood that
the zero interest rate equilibrium will be achieved is extremely small. This 
suggests that there is no need to give any special consideration to a policy move
aimed at exiting such an equilibrium.
(5) Looking at one more combination under an active monetary policy with infla-
tion as a state variable, (A.2), (B.2), and (C.1), the zero interest rate equilibrium
is unstable and, if output is below its equilibrium level, both the inflation rate
and output will decline continuously. Under such conditions, an interest rate
hike would have the negative effect of lowering income, and the economy would
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r = natural interest ratenot return to the normal equilibrium. Nevertheless, the long-run result of a
downward spiral of output is the same as prior to policy implementation. To
return to the normal equilibrium would require somehow increasing demand
and raising output above its natural level.
Determining whether such a deflationary spiral is realistic would require a
more detailed examination. Such a path would occur under an accelerationist
Phillips curve, where the tacit assumption of a constant expected inflation rate
plays a crucial role. That is, for an output gap to develop there must be an error
in forecasting the inflation rate, and since people continue to expect the same
inflation rate as before even with the inflation rate declining, this forecasting
error becomes larger. While it is unrealistic to assume perfect foresight wherein
forecasting error does not occur, it would be more natural to assume inflation
expectations to be modified over the long run. This suggests the need for 
serious reservations over how realistic the result in pattern (5) is.
In consideration of the above, when prices are not flexible, it is clearly important to
be aware of the possibility of inflation not increasing in step with the rise in interest
rates. In this case, real interest rates would rise and cause a downward adjustment to
output, as described in pattern (2) outlined above.
F. Examining the Mechanisms That Determine the Inflation Rate
As already touched upon in Footnote 28, the 20 dynamic models we examine here
include models that are inconsistent with the price determination mechanism normally
posited by the Phillips curve. We now look at this in more detail. To make our 
handling of the state variable more clear, we will describe here a discrete-time model.
The behavioral equations that correspond to (A) with (C) substituted in are
yt+1 − yt =  [r( t) − r –], (A.1′)
yt −y – =−  [r( t) − r –], (A.2′)
while those that correspond to (B) are
33
 t =  [yt − y –] + t +1, (B.1′)
 t −  t−1 =  [yt−1 −y –], (B.2′)
 t −   – =  [yt − y –]. (B.3′)
Looking at the Phillips curve, the inflation rate is a state variable in equation
(B.2′), since it is determined by variables from the prior period, but not in equations
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33. Regarding the timing of the inflation rate used in (A), under a monetary policy that targets the expected inflation
rate, the expected inflation rate one period later is used, while under a monetary policy that adjusts the nominal
interest rate based on the past inflation rate, the past inflation rate must be used. Nevertheless, these timing differ-
ences do not have a significant impact on our argument in this paper, so for simplification we use a formulation
that applies directly to a continuous-time model.(B.1′) and (B.3′), since it does not depend on past variables. Accordingly, there is no
problem in interpreting inflation as a state variable in (B.2) and not doing so in (B.1)
and (B.3). These correspond to patterns (3), (4), and (5) described in Section III.E,
all of which are associated with an active monetary policy.
Meanwhile, our approach to the state variable appears to be inconsistent, since in
pattern (1) we interpret the inflation rate as a non-state variable in equation (B.2) but
in pattern (2) we interpret inflation as a state variable in equations (B.1) and (B.3).
In all of these cases, a passive monetary policy is chosen. A strict interpretation of the
inconsistency would probably require excluding both patterns (1) and (2) from our
model assumptions.
Nevertheless, the Phillips curve considered in this paper adopts a very simple 
formulation in regard to the time structure of the variables. Empirical research on the
Phillips curve normally includes a lag variable for the inflation rate and the unem-
ployment rate (the output gap in our paper), while the actual inflation rate and
income probably have a fairly complex lag structure. Accordingly, a wide range of
dynamic behaviors can occur. It is probably more important to focus on the fact 
that the analysis summarized in Tables 2 and 3 provides for a comprehensive set of
conclusions, including both a negative correlation and a positive correlation between
the inflation rate and output. If dynamic behavior under a Phillips curve with a com-
plex lag structure were to be included in the results summarized in Tables 2 and 3,
our analysis could be interpreted as abbreviated models aimed at expressing the 
various possibilities that could result from the lag structure of the Phillips curve. In
that case, we believe it would be inappropriate to exclude some models based on a
strict interpretation of their inconsistencies.
In fact, below we will give examples of models that show the same dynamic
behavior as in patterns (1) and (2) above using natural assumptions for the state 
variable by slightly altering the Phillips curve equation.
We look first at pattern (1). The accelerationist Phillips curve is structured such
that the inflation rate is determined by its previous levels, and this makes it difficult
to consider a model where the inflation rate is not a state variable when using the
accelerationist Phillips curve. Nevertheless, when considering a New Keynesian
Phillips curve where the output gap has the opposite sign, 
 t =−  [yt − y –] + t+1, (36)
the inflation rate depends on current and future variables and thus is a jumping 
variable. The model has the same dynamic behavior as under the accelerationist
Phillips curve, while under a passive monetary policy rule the equilibrium is a 
source and a unique solution is possible. In other words, we get the same result as in
pattern (1).
Nevertheless, it is impossible to apply micro foundations to the New Keynesian
Phillips curve in this framework, since doing so causes the output gap’s impact on the
inflation rate to have the wrong sign. Consequently, the argument for ruling out 
pattern (1) is persuasive. Nevertheless, the result in pattern (1) is the same as when
prices are flexible as well as when the inflation rate is a jumping variable, so even if
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disappear. Assuming the priority is on the model results, our focus should be on
whether to exclude an adjustment mechanism that assumes a positive correlation
between inflation and output, as in pattern (2).
Moving to pattern (2), we slightly transform (B.3′) to create an equation whereby
the inflation rate is determined by the output gap from the prior period.
 t −   – =  [yt−1 − y –]. (37)
Combining equation (37) with (A.2′), we can express the inflation rate dynamics as
 t −   – =−   [r( t−1) − r –]. (38)
The inflation rate is a state variable in this case, since it is a function of the inflation
rate from the prior period. Accordingly, for the dynamic system to be stable and not
cause any oscillations, this condition must be satisfied.
0 <−   r′<1. (39)
It is clear from the inequality constraint on the left-hand side of equation (39) that
monetary policy must be passive. Also, since the following is a linear approximation
of (A.2′),
yt − y – =−  r′[ t −   –], (40)
it follows that under a passive monetary policy the path to equilibrium must show a
positive correlation between output and the inflation rate. This leads to a dynamic
system in which inflation is a state variable and the correlation between output and
inflation is positive, as described in pattern (2) above.
The combination of (A.2) and (B.3) is not analyzed in Table 2, because it is static.
That said, (A.2) and (B.3) are equivalent to the IS curve and the classic Phillips
curve, and many of the arguments developed in undergraduate macroeconomics 
textbooks are explained through this framework, making it an important model. If it
were possible to make a natural dynamic extension in discrete time, we believe this
model would be well worth analyzing. Accordingly, if we had begun Section III using
discrete-time models, we would have had to include this combination within that
portion of Table 2 where   and y have a positive correlation. In a discrete-time
model, however, it is also possible to include timing for the variables that differs 
from that described above, in which the 20 types of models initially envisioned
would not be sufficient. By using continuous-time models, we had to oversimplify
the complex timing, and the disappearance of the combination of (A.2) and (B.3)
before can be viewed as compensation for this.
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The policy we are proposing here of raising interest rates under deflationary condi-
tions appears to fly in the face of conventional wisdom in macroeconomics. We will
therefore attempt to explain how we reached this conclusion from a different angle.
A discussion of policies aimed at lowering the inflation rate can be found in inter-
mediate macroeconomics textbooks. In the classic explanation, first interest rates are
raised, and if the inflation rate does not immediately adjust, the real interest rate
increases and output decreases. Eventually, however, the inflation rate declines and
output returns to its equilibrium level. This is because raising interest rates at the
outset amounts to an active monetary policy rule. Since lowering the inflation rate by
1 percentage point causes at least a 1 percentage point decline in the nominal interest
rate, if the inflation rate declines so does the real interest rate. Accordingly, if the real
interest rate started out equal to the natural interest rate, under the new, lower infla-
tion target the real interest rate will end up lower than the natural interest rate.
Therefore, as shown in Figure 16, there is a need to equalize the inflation target with
the natural interest rate by adopting a rule of raising interest rates. In a reversal of 
this policy, the path to follow for raising the inflation rate is to lower interest rates
initially, which raises output and then causes the inflation rate to increase.
Of the five patterns described in Section III.E, (1) and (2) are passive monetary
policy rules. In this case, if the inflation rate is going to be raised with interest rates at
their natural level, there is a need to increase the nominal interest rate as in Figure 12.
With the active monetary policy rules of patterns (3) to (5), there is a need to distin-
guish between an interest rate hike implemented by following the rule and an interest
rate hike implemented by changing the rule. When monetary policy is proactive,
interest rates are raised via a rule change, as in Figure 15. Since a passive monetary
policy rule is adopted under zero interest rates, this is another reason why interest
rates must be increased to spark inflation under such a scenario.
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Figure 16  Raising Interest Rates under an Active Monetary Policy Rule




If the central bank commits to zero interest rates when the natural rate of interest is
positive and remains so into the future, there is a risk that deflation will persist. This
paper examines ways to escape from such a deflationary trap. In doing so, we take
account of the imperfect understanding of the economy’s short-term behavior, while
also paying attention to differences in the results from each policy option. The
required policy measures are a money-financed tax cut combined with an interest rate
hike and a commitment to future monetary growth. The amount of tax cut required
is exactly equal to the increase in the central bank’s payments into the national 
treasury resulting from the increase in inflation (higher nominal interest rates), which
allows the fiscal authorities to adhere to a disciplined fiscal policy that maintains both
government debt and the primary balance at stable levels. When prices are flexible,
the appropriate level of inflation quickly arises in the economy. When prices are
sticky, on the other hand, income may decline temporarily, but this is the price that
must be paid to eliminate deflation.
We have an incomplete understanding of the interest rate’s natural level, and this
makes it impossible to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether the 
persistent deflation now confronting the Japanese economy is a deflationary trap or a
liquidity trap that can be explained by a temporary drop in the natural rate of interest.
If in a liquidity trap, the proper policy response is to maintain interest rates at zero, but
if in a deflationary trap, interest rates must be raised. This is Japan’s dilemma: there is
no policy that is robust for both a liquidity trap and a deflationary trap.
This becomes a serious problem when devising policies to move interest rates off 
of zero back to normal levels. The BOJ has declared that it will continue its current
quantitative easing policies until the CPI (nationwide, excluding fresh food) stabilizes
at either a zero or positive rate of growth in year-on-year terms. This policy com-
mitment is aimed at reining in long-term interest rates and, with overnight interest 
rates already at zero, at extracting additional easing benefits. Nevertheless, if in fact 
the economy is in a deflationary trap, the continuation of zero interest rates feeds 
into deflationary expectations, creating the possibility that the conditions required to
abandon the current policy stance may never be achieved. Accordingly, even within 
an environment where the natural rate of interest is deemed to be positive (e.g., 
when we observe rising productivity or improving economic growth), if deflation 
persists there may be a need to consider applying policies aimed at escaping from a
deflationary trap. In this sense, we believe the conditions required for abandoning 
the current policy stance should include, in addition to consistently positive growth 
in the CPI, a reference to the trend in real GDP.
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